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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF PROBATION
ARNE R. JOHNSON
The author is an attorney in a corporate law department in New York City. A Harvard Law
School graduate, he was engaged in the practice of law in New Haven, Connecticut, prior to moving
to New York.
In a study published in 1933, Professor Sam Bass Warner described probation as a "newcomer"
to the law. Using the Warner study as a starting point, Mr. Johnson in the following article de-
scribes the law of probation as it has developed over the last three decades. He reviews the history
of probation law, describes the types of statutory and non-statutory powers to grant probation held
by the courts, and discusses the problems which have developed in the law of probation with respect
to such matters as the split sentence, void suspension of sentence, procedural matters, conditions
and revocation of probation, appellate review, and the due process rights of the probationer. He
presents a critical analysis of the decisions and statutes, pointing out the need for a judicial and
legislative reappraisal of certain portions of the law of probation as it stands today.-EDroR.
INTRODUCTION
Definition of the Problem
Probation has become firmly rooted in our
American legal system. Today it is recognized as a
legitimate and useful tool in the judge's exercise
of the sentencing power. Speaking before the
American Bar Association, Chief Justice Warren
recently said:
"I have dealt with the subject of probation
at some length because its importance is too
often lost sight of in the welter of our social and
legal problems. The public and even our own
profession know altogether too little about it
as a factor in the administration of criminal
justice."'
This paper attempts to analyze the growing
jurisprudence of what we may call the American
law of probation. We shall be primarily concerned
with the legal aspects of the probation statutes,
rather than with the effectiveness of probation
as a "penal-correctional" device.
The starting point of this analysis is a similar
study conducted by Professor Sam Bass Warner
in 1933. He wrote:
"Many of our legal doctrines have been de-
veloping for centuries, but probation is a new-
comer to the law.... One result of this new-
ness of probation is that the hundreds of ques-
tions involved in the interpretation of the
various probation acts and the dividing line
between probation and the other dispositions of
offenders, have not had time to be worked out
' Warren, Probation in the Federal Systen of Criminal
Justice, 19 FED. PEOB. 3 (1955).
by the courts. There is thus no well-defined law
of probation, but only a few cases on scattered
problems; often not even enough to furnish a
reliable indication of the direction in which
the law is developing."
2
Brief History of Probation in the United States
Probation as we now know it is generally re-
garded as the invention of John Augustus of
Massachusetts and dates from about 18 3 1.a There
were in England, prior to that time, devices such
as benefit of clergy, judicial reprieve, and right of
sanctuary, which were akin to probation in that
they suspended the imposition or execution of
the sentence.4 Augustus, however, appears to have
been the first concerned with helping convicted
persons rehabilitate themselves by means of
supervision.
The first statute regarding probation was passed
in Massachusetts in 1878.5 It is to be noted, how-
ever, as Professor Timasheff tells us, that "pro-
bation originated in the common law."8 An ap-
parently widespread use of common law probation
prevailed in the federal courts (as well as in some
state courts) until 1916, when the United States
Supreme Court held that federal courts had no
inherent common law power to suspend either
WARNER, PROBATION AND CRInsNAl JUsTIcE 23
(S. Glueck ed. 1933).
3 Timasheff, Probation in Contemporary Law, 1
CoNTEmp. LAW PAMPHIETs (1941).
4 Webster, The Evolution of Probation in American
Law, 1 BUFFALO L. REv. 249, 251 (1952).
5 Timasheff, supra note 3, at 2.
6 Ibid.
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the imposition or execution of sentenceY Following
this decision the Natiohal Probation Association
and other advocates of probation began to agitate
for a federal probation act.8 In 1925 the first
national statute was enacted.9
PowERi To SUSPEND SENTENCE
WIrHouT PROBATION
For the most part, probation law in the United
States today derives from statutes which authorize
trial judges to grant convicted persons a period of
probation under supervision. Like the federal
courts, most state courts do not recognize an
inherent common law power to suspend either the
imposition or execution of sentence;' 0 a few state
courts, however, do recognize such a power."
It is interesting to note, too, that New York and
Texas have statutes which allow suspended sen-
tence without probation," in addition to statutes
authorizing probation. The Texas Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals has held that the two statutes are
unrelated, and that the trial judge has an option
to use either statute in a particular case."
In practical effect, both common law and
statutory suspension of sentence without proba-
tion circumvent the techniques of probation and
the aim of supervised rehabilitation. It is submitted
that the federal and majority of states' practice of
limiting suspension of sentence to that authorized
under the probation statutes is more in line with
sound correctional theory.
STATUTORY PROBATION IN THE UNITED STATES
Power to Grant Probation
(1) Constitutional Objections. The constitutional-
ity of the probation statutes has been attacked on
the ground that judicial suspension of sentence
encroaches upon the executive powers of parole and
pardon; however the federal courts and the great
_7E parte United States, 242 U.S. 27 (1916).
8 Meyer, A Half Century of Federal Probation and
Parole, 42 J. Cans. L., C. & P.S. 707 (1952).
9 Probation Act 1925, CoMP. STAT. 10564t-
10564* C.
20 People v. Sidwell, 27 Cal.2d 121, 162 P.2d 913
(1945).
n See E parte Samber, 13 N.J. Super. 410, 80 A.2d
487 (1951); Er parte Kuney, 68 Misc. 285, 5 N.Y.S.2d
644 (1938).
12 TEx. CODE Cium. PRoc. § 776-81 (1948). See
People v. Moore, 184 Misc. 444, 53 N.Y.S.2d 189
(Sup. Ct. 1945) and Ex parte Kuney, 68 Misc. 285, 5
N.Y.S.2d 644 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
13 F- parte Pittman, 157 Tex. Crim. 301, 248 S.W.2d
159 (1952).
majority of state courts have long upheld the
constitutionality of probation statutes.14
(2) Two Types of Sentence Suspension. His-
torically two distinct methods of suspending
sentence have been employed. The first is suspen-
sion of the imposition of sentence, whereby the
court does not pass sentence at all after conviction.
The second is suspension of the execution of sen-
tence, whereby the court passes sentence but does
not execute it during the probationary period.
In the federal probation system the courts may
employ either method of suspending sentence.' 5
In some of the state systems, however, only one
method is allowed; 16 the result is that a premium
is sometimes placed on the difference between
suspension of the imposition of sentence and
suspension of the execution of sentence.
In Pennsylvania, for example, the probation
statute grants only the power to suspend imposi-
tion of sentence. The Superior Court of Penn-
sylvania, faced with a situation where the trial
court had first imposed sentence and then
suspended its execution, held that the trial judge
could not place the defendants on probation."
Similarly, the Superior Court of Delaware held
that the court had to grant probation before
imposing sentence at all; otherwise probation
could not be granted."8
In these cases the harsh results of depriving
the courts of power to grant probation appear
to be forced by the statutes themselves. A drafts-
man taking note of tfhs would do well to include
both suspension techniques in his* scheme, as
was done in the federal system.
The Supreme Court in Korematsu v. United
States9 wisely disregarded the technical distinc-
tion between imposition and execution of sen-
tence. There the court held that suspension of
imposition was a "final decision" for purposes of
appeal.20
4See Nix v. James, 7 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1925);
Chappell, The Courts Interpret the Federal Probation
Act, 29 J. Cans. L. & C. 708 (1939).
"5 Riggs v. United States, 14 F.2d 5 (4th Cir. 1926).
16 See Epstein, A Survey of the Law of Probation and
Parole in Pennsylvania, 30 TEp. L. Q. 309 (1957).
17 Commonwealth v. Denson, 40 A.2d 895 (Super.
Ct. Pa. 1936). This statute has also given the Penn-
sylvania courts difficulty with regard to appeal. The
traditional doctrine that a defendant can only appeal
from a final judgement has had to be fudged in regard
to allowing an appeal from the imposition of sentence
suspension. See Commonwealth v. Trunk, 311 Pa.
555,167 Atl. 333 (1933).
Is Frabizzio v. State, 44 Del. 395, 59 A.2d 452 (1948).
1 319 U.S. 432 (1943).
20 Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the court, de-
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It is to be hoped that the probation statutes of
the several states and the courts interpreting these
statutes will de-emphasize the technical difference
between the modes of suspending sentence, so as
not to hamper unduly the administration of
criminal justice in the important area of proba-
tion.
(3) Partial Granting of Probation. When the
court may impose a fine with or without imprison-
ment, it may be faced with special problems.
No reason is readily apparent why a court may not
grant probation of a fine, where that is the only
penalty involved, and it was held in United States
v. Berger2l that the court may grant probation
upon a sentence of a fine alone.
When the sentence is both a fine and imprison-
ment, some courts have more difficulty. In Shew-
maker v. Staten the Criminal Court of Appeals
of Oklahoma struck down an order of the trial
judge sentencing the defendant to pay a $500
fine but suspending sentence with probation as
to the imprisonment penalty.
Other courts run into trouble with fine and
probation under statutes which allow only the
suspension of imposition of sentence and not the
suspension of the execution thereof. In this
situation if the court imposes a fine but suspends
imposition of imprisonment and grants probation,
the probation is void because a sentence, i.e.,
the fine, has already been imposed.2
These difficulties regarding fine and probation
are unfortunate and in most cases appear un-
necessary. There seems to be no logical reason
why a court should be unable to grant probation
of a prison term while still imposing a fine. Courts
are allowed to accomplish practically the same
result by imposing restitution as a condition of
probation. Perhaps there is a policy question for
the court to consider as to the desirability of
granting probation as to only one portion of a
sentence; this policy factor, however, should not
be confused with the courts' power to suspend
part of a sentence.
(4) Courts' Power to Grant Probation Where
Defendant is Convicted of Several Counts. When a
defendant has been convicted on several counts
or on several indictments, the question arises
dared: "The difference to the probationer between
imposition of sentence followed by probation ... and
suspension of the imposition of sentence is one of
trifling degree." 319 U.S. at 435.
21 145 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1944).
22 329 P.2d 858 (Okla. Crim. 1958).
2 Frabizzio v. State, 44 Del. 395, 59 A.2d 452 (1948).
whether the court may grant probation as to
certain counts while sentencing the defendant to
pfison on other counts. The federal courts have
long struggled with this problem. When the court
sentences the defendant to imprisonment on one
count and puts the defendant on probation with
respect to a second consecutive count before custody
has begun at all, the courts are in agreement that
the sentence is valid a If the defendant has already
begun serving sentence on one count, however,
can he subsequently be granted probation on
counts not yet served?
In United States v. Murray5 the Supreme Court
held that once a man has begun to serve his sen-
tence, the District Court loses all power to grant
probation. The rationale behind the Court's
reasoning was that the purpose of probation is
to save the criminal from the ill effects of first
imprisonment and that once imprisonment has
begun the court should refrain from interfering
with the executive's administration of parole.
It is important to note, however, that the Mur-
ray case dealt with a single crime and did not pass
on the situation where successive counts are
involved. The Courts of Appeals, faced with the
several counts issue, proceeded to go separate
ways. On the one hand, the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit, in Phillips v. United States,26
decided to extend the Murray doctrine and held
that the court could not grant probation on a
successive count while the defendant was serving
time on the first.7 On the other hand the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Kirk v. United
Statesw concluded that the court may grant proba-
tion in this situation. The Supreme Court settled
the question in Affronti v. United States,9 ap-
proving the Murray case and disapproving of
Kirk.
It is submitted that the Phillips and Affronti
decisions fail to distinguish the policy question
from that of judicial authority to suspend sen-
tence and grant probation. As previously noted,
21 Frad v. Kelley, 302 U.S. 312 (1937); Cosman v.
United States, 303 U.S. 617 (1938).
25 275 U.S. 347 (1927).
26 212 F.2d 327 (8th Cir. 1954).
27 The editors of the Yale Law Journal explain
Phillips thus: "Although Murray involved only a single
sentence, the Eighth Circuit felt that it controlled
Phillips because the consequences of imprisonment in
terms of hardening influence and overlapping juris-
diction were the same in both cases." 64 YALE L. J.
260, 261 (1955).
2 185 F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1950).
29 350 U.S. 79 (1955).
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the granting of probation on a successive count,
where the sentence on the first count has not yet
begun, is clearly'within the authority of thedistrict
courts.10 If the Supreme Court wanted to forbid
such a practice on "penal correctional" policy
grounds or indeed on statutory grounds, it should
have gone the whole way and outlawed the prac-
tice altogether.3
Cogent policy arguments can be urged for
allowing courts flexibility regarding the use of
probation when several counts are involved. In
addition, such a decision with regard to the
granting of probation on successive counts seems
more properly left to Congress than to the courts.
The present statuten gives the trial judge broad
power to suspend sentence and grant probation.
In light of this grant the Supreme Court might
have better followed Kirk v. United States, leaving
statutory restrictions of federal probation up to
Congress.
(5) Courts' Power to Grant Probation With
Imprisonment: The Split Sentence. May a judge
impose a period of imprisonment as a condition of
probation? This is a separate problem from that
involving the separate count. Here, only one
crime is involved, and the issue is whether the
court can "split" the sentence between imprison-
ment and probation. As a policy matter it has
been seriously questioned whether the use of the
split sentence is advisable." The important point
for purposes of this discussion, however, is whether
the courts have power to grant a split sentence.
In 1933 Professor Warner concluded that the
federal judge could not impose such a sentence,
reasoning that to grant a split sentence would
encroach upon the power of the executive to
pardon.4 The federal courts have agreed with this
view.35 This rule appears consistent with the rule
that after a sentence of imprisonment has com-
menced the court loses jurisdiction to the parole
.board. In the several count situation, however,
"0 The Supreme Court itself allowed the granting.of
probation on one count, coupled with imprisonment on
another count, where no custody had begun. Frad v.
Kelley, 302 U.S. 312 (1937).
3 "'his, indeed, is the view advocated by a Ilar,.ard
Law Re-qcw note. 55 HARV. L. REV. 1210 (1941).
3243 Stat. 1259, as amended, 18 U.S.C.A. 3651
(1952).
1See 29 J. Cram. L. & C. 427, 432 (1938); 23 FED.
PROB. 12 (1959).
31 WAmr. rp.xi!. upra note 2, at 37.
11 United Siatcs v Greenhaus, 85 F.2d 116 (2d Cir.
1936).
the court has not lost jurisdiction over the second
count, as no imprisonment has yet started.
Turning to the state courts, we find a difference
of opinion. Under the general probation statutes,
a majority of those states which have passed on
the question hold with Warner and the federal
courts.36 At least one state, South Carolina, dis-
sents and interprets the ordinary probation
statute as including authority to split the sen-
tence.F
Where a specific statutory sanction of the split
sentence is made, the courts have recognized the
power to impose a period of imprisonment as a
condition of probation. An example of this is
Michigan, which denied the court power under
the general probation statutes but upheld it under
specific statutory grant.n
In conclusion, most states will not allow a
judge to grant a split sentence unless the legis-
lature has provided explicit statutory power to do
so. While many authorities raise serious questions
as to the advisability of solitting a sentence, there
appears to be little doubt as to the constitutional
power to enact such statutes.
(6) When Probation May Be Granted. The
outer limit of time within which the judge may
place .the defendant on probation is the commence-.
ment of the execution of the sentence. United
States v. Murray clearly establishes this rule,
which is generally followed by the states.
41
But what about various stages in the judicial
process up to "the beginning of execution of sen-
t0nce? The federal rule today is that the court
may grant probation after appeal as well as after
expiration of the term of court of original convic-
tion, ai long as execution of sentence has not com-
menced.41 This rule appears sound.
Most courts agree that the trial judge should be
allowed a reasonable time in which to have a
36 See Annot., 147 A.L.R. 656 (1943).
17 Moore v. Patterson, 203 S.C. 90, 26 S.E.2d 319
(1943).
8People v. Robinson, 253 Mich. 507, 235 N.W. 236
(1931).
39 People v. Sarnoff, 302 Mich. 266, 4 N.W.2d 544
(1942).
10 United States v. Murray, 275 U.S. 347 (1927);
State v. McKelvey, 30 Ariz. 265, 246 Pac. 550 (1926).
4: Mintie v. Biddle, 288 U.S. 206 (1933). Such a
view, however, was not originally adopted by all
federal courts. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit held in Mintie v. Biddle, 15 F.2d 931 (8th Cir.
1926), that the trial court lost jurisdiction of the
defendant with the expiration of the term of court at
which defendant had been convicted. Rosenwinkel v.
Hall, 61 F.2d 724 (7th Cir. 1931), held to the contrary.
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probation report prepared. 0 Beyond this, however,
the state decisions go off on local grounds. Thus
the Court of Appeals of Ohio in the case of Ex
parte Steinmetz stated:
"In the absence of a permissive statute the
indefinite postponement of sentence upon one
convicted of crime deprives the court of juris-
diction to pronounce sentence at a subsequent
term and is in effect a discharge of the pri-
soner. .. ."
Such a result, of course, would not be possible
in the federal system, the court having no power
indefinitely to suspend sentence without proba-
tion. It is to be hoped that the states will adopt
the federal rule as being more consistent with the
objectives of probation.
(7) Effect of Void Suspension of Sentence.
If the trial court does not possess authority to
suspend sentence and grant probation, what is
the result of an abortive attempt to do so? When
the trial court becomes aware of its error may it
impose or execute sentence without probation,
in other words, send the defendant to prison?
Here again it is necessary to distinguish between
imposition and execution of sentence. Where the
court has imposed sentence but suspended execu-
tion, the overwhelming weight of authority allows
the court to carry out the sentence as originally
imposed.# This rule allows the sentence to be
executed after the term at which it was imposed.
The rationale of the courts is that where a valid
sentence has been imposed, the suspension of
which was a mere nullity, the original sentence is
still in force.
When the court has not imposed sentence,
however, but has suspended the imposition thereof,
the courts disagree as to the effects of a void
suspension. The prevailing federal rule allows the
trial court to impose sentence just as if the void
suspension had never taken place. 45 Some states
follow the federal view. 4 Many other states,
however, deny the trial court power to impose a
sentence after a void order of suspension of im-
position of sentence.0 These cases appear to turn
on the proposition that it is unfair later to sentence
a defendant who has never been sentenced. Some
See 24 CJ.S. 1618 (1941).
35 Ohio App. 491, 172 N.E. 623 (1930).
"Dawson -v. Sisk, 231 Iowa 1291, 4 N.W.2d 272
(1942); Morgan v. Adams, 226 Fed. 719 (8th Cir. 1915).
45 Miller v. Aderhold, 288 U.S. 206 (1933).
46 See Paige v. Smith, 130 Pa. Super. 536, 198 At.
812 (1938).
47 See Annot., 141 A.L.R. 1226 (1942).
courts will allow a later sentence if imposed at
the same term of court as the conviction."
The rule allowing enforcement of sentence at a
later period if execution was suspended, and the
rule denying power later to impose sentence if the
original imposition of sentence was suspended
both appear subject to criticism. There appears
to be no statute of limitations regarding void
execution. In addition, a void suspension of im-
position appears to result in a loss of jurisdiction
to sentence the defendant. The net result is that
no matter how long after a void suspension of
execution, a court may send a defendant to prison,
but presumably a court could not sentence a
defendant even shortly after a void suspension of
imposition.
A better view might be to abolish the distinction
for this purpose between imposition and execution
of sentence and adopt the federal rule, allowing
enforcement after a void suspension of either type.
Coupled with this, however, should be some judicial
laches or a statute of limitations to ensure that a
defendant is protected from execution of sentence
long after a void suspension.
Procedures in Granting Probation
(1) Who May Be Granted Probation? Not
everyone convicted of a crime may obtain proba-
tion. Such, apparently, is not the case in Great
Britain.6° In the United States, however, the
statutes generally limit the offenses to which
probation may be applied as well as the type of
offenders who may qualify." Typically, probation
may not be granted to a person previously "con-
victed of a felony" or to "persons accused of
murder, rape and first degree arson."''
Undoubtedly there are policy reasons for
denying probation to certain offenders. The pro-
bation statutes, however, and the courts inter-
preting them, have brought about a -morass of
confusion and such weird results as denying
probation to prisoner X because he carried a gun
in a robbery, while allowing probation to Y,
who employed a different weapon. There is need
for a careful redrafting of probation statutes to
48Dawson v. Sapp, 87 Kan. 740, 125 Pac. 78 (1912).
49 For cases pointing in this direction see Ex parle
Bugg, 163 Mo. App. 44, 145 S.W. 831 (1909); Ez parie
Brown, 297 S.W. 445 (Mo. Ct. of Appeals, 1927).
"0 GIovxn, PROBATION AND RE-EDucAIoN 2 (1956).
"See CosuIacH, ADuLT PROBATION LAWS or r=s
UNnTx STATEs, 22 et seq. (1940); NAT'L PROBATION
AND PAROLE ASS'N, STANDARD PROBATION AND PAROIE
AcT 1-45 (1955).
7 Wyo. L.J. 104 (1952).
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develop some rhyme or reason for excluding
probation at the threshold to some while granting
it to others.
(2) Application for and Refusal of Probation.
While many states merely provide that the judge
shall conside probation in each appropriate case,
some states require a defendant to make formal
application for probation.0 The federal statute does
not require that defendant make application for
probation." In the federal system and in those
states not requiring formal application, probation
is left to the discretion of the trial judge, as one of
a number of sentencing possibilities. Where formal
application is required, the defendant must ask
for probation or the court is powerless to grant
it.55
If the defendant does submit a timely applica-
tion for probation the court must consider it, i.e.,
exercise its discretion." In Texas the defendant's
right to apply for probation is protected by statute,
and the defendant is entitled to counsel, appointed
by the court if necessary, to present his "case"
for probation.7
A serious policy question is raised regarding the
desirability of formal application. Although the
Texas practice safeguards the defendant in seeing
to it that his application is formally considered,
it perhaps goes too far in tying up the admin-
istration of sentencing by the court. The federal
practice of routine consideration of probation in
all cases seems preferable to formal application.
It is settled that no defendant has a right to be
placed on probation." Once it is dear that the
court has exercised its discretion and denied
probation, the defendant may not force a court
to grant it. Whether the defendant may refuse
probation and demand that the court impose
statutory sentence is another matter.
Cooper v. United States" is still regarded as a
leading federal authority on this question. In
13 See McMurray v. State, 119 Tex. Crim. 74, 45
.SAV.2d 217 (1932).
"18 U.S.C.A. 3651 (1948).
55 The Supreme Court of Illinois has stated: "When
probation is not asked, the court has no discretion as
to the extent of the punishment. In such cases the
indeterminate sentence fixed by statute must be im-
posed." People v. Donovan, 376 Ill. 602, 35 N.E.2d
54 (1941).
66 State v. Boston, 233 Iowa 1294, 11 N.W.2d 407
(1943).
7 Arsola v. State, 138 Tex. Crim. 1, 33 S.W.2d 585
(1939).
8Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211 (1937);
Varela v. Merrill, 51 Ariz. 64, 74 P.2d 569 (1937).
19 91 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1937)
that case the Courtof Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held that the defendant could not refuse proba-
tion. In contrast, Persall v. State,"0 decided by the
Court of Appeals of Alabama, points out that the
overwhelming weight of authority is in favor of
allowing the defendant to refuse probation and
take his statutory medicine, as it were. The
court in Persall notes that other federal courts
have questioned the Cooper holding." In addition,
the court notes that the purpose of probation is
non-penal in character and that a prisoner forced
to undergo probation will hardly be susceptible
to the rehabilitation offered.
That this question is far from academic can be
seen from the humber of adjudications on the
point. Apparently it is often raised where a de-
fendant considers the conditions of probation
imposed by. the court to be too harsh and would
rather serve time than endure the conditions.
In this situation Persall seems to follow the better
rule. The defendant should be allowed his choice;
otherwise, the court is permitted to force non-
statutory terms of sentence upon him. If the
United States Supreme Court considers this point.
under the federal statute, it is hoped that the
Court will overrule Cooper v. United States.
(3) Use of Probation Offcers' Report in Granting
or Denying Probation. The trend in the law of
probation is toward a mandatory requirement
that the probation department conduct an in-
vestigation and prepare a report for the sentencing
judge in every case in which the court has the
power to grant probation.n In some jurisdictions
the court need not order a report 63 if the judge feels
the crime committed was so serious, or defendant's
reputation so bad that the court would not be
justified in granting probation.
The court is usually required to consider the
probation report, but it is not bound thereby."
60 31 Ala. App. 309, 16 So. 2d 332 (1944).
61 See Kaplan v. Hecht, 234 F.2d 664 (2d Cir. 1956).
62 Federal Rule 32c states: "The probation service of
the court shall make a presentence investigation and
report to the court before the imposition of sentence or
the granting of probation unless the court otherwise
directs. ." FED. R. Camn. P. 32, 18 U.S.C.A. 350
(1946).
6A few states provide that the jury shall decide
when defendant is to be granted probation; fortunately
the states are turning away from this practice, and
only a few now use it. See 24 C.J.S. 1571 (1941). Con-
sequently, few points are litigated in appellate courts
regarding the jury's granting of probation. In an
examination of over 400 cases the author rarely came
across the point in an appellate report.
4People v. Johnson, 106 Cal. App. 815, 236 P.2d
190 (1951).
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Thus, the court may not delegate to the probation
officer the duty of fixing conditions of probation,
but may incorporate into a sentence the recom-
mendations of the probation department.65
A mandatory provision requiring the court to
have a probation report prepared in every case
appears to be founded on good sense. If probation
is to become a full partner with other more tradi-
tional modes of sentencing, such a report would
seem necessary in each case, no matter what the
final outcome is.
The use of a probation report raises some serious
due process issues: must the court, for example,
permit the defendant to view the report, to cross
examine the probation officer, or to offer evidence
on his own behalf? Some courts consider that the
defendant has substantial constitutional rights in
this area. The Supreme Court of Appeals of
Virginia has concluded that it is error for a court
to refuse defendant an opportunity to cross exam-
ine the contents of the probation report.
6
The defendant's constitutional rights with
regard to sentencing were considered by the
United States Supreme Court in Williams v. New
York. 67 In that case Williams had been convicted
of first degree murder and sentenced by the court
to death, despite a recommendation for life im-
prisonment by the jury. In determining the sen-
tence, the trial judge considered reports containing
a good deal of out of court information regarding
the defendant's past history. The defendant was
denied the right to cross examine these reports as
well as the persons who prepared them. Mr.
Justice Black, in a considered opinion, concluded
that due process does not demand that a de-
fendant be permitted to cross examine witnesses
and reports used by the judge in determining
sentence. 68 Mr. Justice Murphy dissented, stating:
"The record before us indicates that the judge
65 Whitehead v. United States, 155 F.2d 460 (6th
Cir. 1946).66 Linton v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 437, 65 S.E.2d
534 (1951). A somewhat lesser right was allowed by a
California court in People v. Loeber, the court con-
cluding: "If appellant believed the report to be insuffi-
cient, vague or indefinite, he was entitled to present
witnesses to testify in mitigation of his punishment at
the time of his hearing on application for probation."
138 Cal. App. 730, 323 P.2d 136, 140 (1958).
337 U.S. 241 (1949).
Is Mr. Justice Black wrote at 337 U.S. 246: "We
must recognize that most of the information now
relied -upon by judges to guide them in the intelligent
imposition of sentences would be unavailable if informa-
tion were restricted to that given in open court by
witnesses subject to cross-examination."
exercised his discretion to deprive a man of his
life, in reliance on material made available to
him in a probation report, consisting of evidence
that would -have been inadmissable at the
trial .... I am forced to conclude that the high
commands of due process were not obeyed." 69
The decision exemplifies the central problem of
balancing the requirements of due process with
intelligent sentencing procedures in the orderly
administration of criminal justice. Many facets
of this question are still open, especially in the
state courts. The author favors Mr. Justice Black's
views in Williams v. New York, but feels these
difficult constitutional issues must await more
adjudication before the line between the legitimate
requirements of probation administration and
those of due process can be pricked outY
Conditions of Probation
(1) Statutory Conditions. In most jurisdictions
the statutory conditions of probation are neither
mandatory nor all-inclusive.7' Thus, the federal
statute states that certain conditions are "among
the conditions" that "the defendant may be re-
quired" to observe.n One statutory condition
often imposed requires that the defendant remain
on "good behavior" during the probationary
period. What constitutes "good behavior" has been
litigated.n
State v. Gordon74 concerned a statutory definition
of "good behavior" specifying that the offender
shall not be convicted "of any other crime."
The probationer was convicted of. a federal
offense, and the Louisiana Supreme Court ruled
69 337 U.S. at 253.
70 With regard to the reasons why courts grant or
refuse probation, the situation is little different in 1960
than when Warner wrote in 1933. Very infrequently
does one find a detailed analysis in the reports of why
a court passed as it did on a particular probation
application. For views on this point see Logan v. People,
138 Colo. 304, 332 P.2d 897 (1958); Morgan v. Foster,
208 Ga. 630, 68 S.E.2d 583 (1952); Murray, Prison
or Probation, Which and Why? 47 J. CRa-. L., C. &P.S. 451 (1956). i, "
71 CosuucH, ADULT PROBATION LAws OF THE
UNITED STATEs 28 (1940).
72 18 U.S.C.A. 3651 (1948). (Emphasis supplied.)
7The Supreme Court of North Carolina interprets
the requirespent as follows: "The term 'good behavior'
used in the-order means in obedience to and conformity
with the laws of the state: the demeanor of a law abiding
citizen.. .behavior such as will warrant a finding that
a defendant has breached the conditions of suspension
on good behavior must be conduct which constitutes a
violation of some criminal law of the state." State v.
Millner, 240 N.C. 602, 83 S.W.2d 46 (1954).
74 274 La. 822, 38 S.2d 794 (1949).
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that conviction of "any other crime" included
any conviction, whether local, federal, or foreign,
and was not restricted to crimes punishable under
the laws of Louisiana.
In some states all statutory conditions are
made conditions of every probation. The Michigan
Supreme Court has said that such mandatory
conditions apply in each case; the defendant is
bound to know them whether he has actual notice
or not.78
(2) Non-Statutory Conditions. Conditions im-
posed by the judge under his discretionary power
raise significant problems, A general statement
often found is:
"A condition of probation of course, must
not be unmoral, illegal or impossible of per-
formance. The probationer is entitled to fair
treatment and is not to be -made the victim
of whim or caprice."
76
A stricter standard sometimes voiced by courts
was applied by the Arizona Supreme Court in
Redewill v. Supreme Court.7 In that case the trial
judge placed the defendant on probation for non-
support of a minor child. The court imposed as a
condition that the defendant pay for the child's
support and education until three years after the
child reached majority age. The appellate court
struck down this condition on the ground that it
had no relation to the prevention of crime. It may
be quite difficult, however, in a particular case,
to define what conditions are aimed at prevention
of the same crime.
One of the earliest conditions imposed was
banishment from the locality or even from the
state. The trend today is to hold such a condition
void as a matter of public policy. In State v. Dough-
tie the Supreme Court of North Carolina declared:
"It is not sound public policy to make other
states a dumping ground for our criminals."Th
Restitution for injury done to others as a con-
dition has raised a number of questions. The
courts appear to be wary of restitution as a con-
dition. Although some probation statutes specifi-
cally allow restitution as a condition," the courts
scrutinize such provisions. carefully. Thus, the
75 People v. George, 318 Mich. 329, 28 N.W.2d 86
(1947).
76 Basile v. United States, 38 A.2d 620, 622 (D.C.
Mun. Ct. App. 1944).
77 43 Ariz. 68, 29 P.2d 475 (1934).
78237 N.C. 368, 74 S.E.2d 922, 924 (1953).
71 See 18 U.S.C.A. 3651 (1948).
amount must be liquidated 0 and reasonably re-
lated to the crime committed."' The Vermont
Supreme Court invalidated a condition that de-
fendant pay victims' medical bills, when the
latter had not been tried out in a civil suit."
In People v. Prell" the court in a confused opinion
said that statutory restitution does not authorize
the judge to impose payment of civil damages as a
condition of probation.
A study of the restitution cases in the probation
area shows a definite need to bring order out of
chaos. Restitution appears to be a legitimate aim
of probation in encouraging the defendant to
rehabilitate hiniself by becoming a responsible
citizen. The cases show, however, that despite
statutory authorization the unwary trial judge
may find himself reversed because he did not
frame his condition of restitution within the nar-
row technical limits set by the appellate courts.
A careful legislative or adjudicative reform is
needed in this area.
A number of other conditions of probation have
been imposed by the trial courts from time to
time. The Supreme Court of California upheld a
condition, imposed on defendants convicted of
crimes connected with unions, whereby defendants
were forbidden to hold any union position during
the probationary period.m Similarly, a federal
court upheld a condition that defendants, con-
victed of crimes on interstate railroad cars, not
return to interstate railroad employment during
the probationary period.85
Other conditions have not been so successful.
A New York court in an unclear, opinion struck
down as unreasonable a condition that defendant
take out automobile insurance for sixty days
following a traffic offense. 8 A most unusual con-
dition was that imposed in Springer v. United
States0' when the trial court, after sentencing de-
fendant for draft evasion, ordered that defendant
-'donate a pint of blood to the Red Cross within
80 People v. Frink, 68 N.Y.S.2d 103 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1947).
81 People v. Becker, 349 Mich. 476, 84 N.W.2d 833
(1957).
82 State v. Barnett, 110 Vt. 221, 3 A.2d 521 (1939).
"299 I1. App. 130, 19 N.E.2d 637 (1939); Contra,
Freeman v. United States, 254 F.2d 352 (D.C. Cir.
1958).
4 People v. Osslo, 50 Cal. 75, 323 P.2d 397 (1958).
U0 Stone v. United States, 153 F.2d 331 (9th Cir.
1946).
81 City of Rochester v, Newton, 169 Misc. 726, 8
N.Y.S.2d 441 (N.Y. County Ct. 1938).
87 148 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1945).
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thirty days! The court struck this down pre-
sumably as an unreasonable condition not within
trial courts' discretion. Law review comment on
this case points out there may well be a due
process objection to such a condition."
Now and then a question arises regarding the
applicability of a condition under changed circum-
stances. A New Jersey court was faced with a
situation where the defendant had become men-
tally ill during probation. The court held that
such an illness was a "lawful excuse" for not
adhering to a condition that defendant find em-
ployment."
A special problem occurs with regard to partial
imprisonment. The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit allowed a condition whereby
defendant had to surrender to a United States
marshal once a week for twenty-four hours.90
Gray v. Graham is a Kansas case where the court
sustained a condition that defendant undergo
hospitalization." These cases are closely connected
with a state's policy regarding a split sentence,
discussed above. Perhaps hospitalization should
be differentiated from partial imprisonment and
allowed as a condition within the trial judge's
discretion. A state revising its probation code
would do well to differentiate hospitalization from
split sentence.
It is difficult to generalize regarding appellate
courts' treatment of conditions. There appears to
be agreement regarding the undesirability of
banishment as a condition. Much confusion,
however, exists regarding restitution. In other
situations trial courts have shown ingenuity in-
developing new conditions of probation to fit the
particular case. Appellate courts on the whole
appear sympathetic, but a more precise analysis
must await new cases. One point may be empha-
sized: the legislature could help in this area by
enumerating new statutory conditions which the
court may impose in its discretion. This enumera-
tion, however, should be permissive and not all-
inclusive, so as to better the courts' use of proba-
tion as a flexible sentencing aid.
8 59 CoLum.x L. RFv. 317 (1959).
81 State v. Moretti, 50 N.J. Super. 223, 141 A.2d 810
(1958); for a similar "frustration" case see State v.
Robinson, 232 N.C. 418, 61 S.E.2d 107 (1950).
90 United States v. Murphy, 217 F.2d 247 (7th Cir.
1954).
91 128 Kan. 434, 278 Pac. 14 (1929). Contra, Ex parte
Funk, 79 Cal. App. 659, 250 Pac. 714 (1926).
Revocation of Probation
(1) Statutory Authority to Revoke
(a) Who May Revoke? Courts have power under
the probation statutes to revoke probation."
A question has arisen, however, as to just who may
exercise the power to revoke. Some courts have
held that only the particular judge who sentenced
the defendant can revoke his probation." A
much better view is that held by the federal and
some state courts: the power to revoke is ex-
ercisable by any judge of the court in which
sentence was imposed, and not only by the par-
ticular sentencing judge."
(b) Time When Probation May Be Revoked.
How long after the grant may probation be re-
voked? The federal rule is that probation may be
revoked at any time within the probationary
period (five years) or within the maximum period
for which defendant might have been sentenced
for his crime. Thus, where the original sentence
could have been longer than the five year pro-
bationary period, the federal courts may revoke
after the expiration of probation but within the
time of maximum sentence.'
5
Some states allow revocation qnly within the
period of probation.9' In Ohio, however, there
apparently is no limit on the time for revocation.97
It appears that the technical differences between
the states and federal practices regarding time
of revocation do not matter very substantially.
But the Ohio practice is open to serious question
as to the wisdom of allowing revocation long
after. the term of probation has expired. It is
hoped that all jurisdictions will adopt some time
limitation concerning probation revocation.
(c) Grouhds for Revocation. The federal rule as
well as that followed by a majority of states is
that there must be a violation of a condition in
92If probation is not revoked it expires at the end
of the period. Whether it ends ipso facto or only by a
formal release by the court no longer appears to be
more than an academic question. See McBee v. State,
166 Tex. Crim. 562, 316 S.W.2d 748 (1958).
9Ex parte Smith, 232 Mo. App. 521, 119 S.W.2d
65 (1938).
14United States v. Greenhaus, 85 F.2d 116 (2d Cir.
1936); Ex parte Combs, 87 Okla. Crim. 164, 195 P.2d
772 (1948).
"5 Mason v. Zerbst, 74 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1935).
96 Brooks v. State, 51 Ariz. 544, 78 P.2d 498 (1938);
Annot. 117 A.L.R. 925 (1938).
97 State v.. Brewster, 75 Ohio App. 329, 62 N.E.2d
174 (1944).
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order for the court to revoke probation. Cali-
fornia, however, follows a minority rule, and in
the absence of a statutory restriction allows its
trial judges to revoke probation without a vio-
lation of conditions.P
As a policy matter, limiting revocation to a
violation of conditions seems a proper procedure
as long as the court's discretion in revoking is
not unduly fettered. The ordinary trial procedures
are usually relaxed in revocation proceedings, so
as to make revocation easier for the court.
(2) Court's Power After Violation of Probation
Upon violation of probation the court has
several alternatives. The judge may continue the
probation, perhaps warning the probationer to
behave himself in the future, or the court may
extend the probationary period. Under most
probation statutes00 the court may also change
the conditions of probation, and even impose new
conditions.
Far more drastic is the court's power to revoke
probation and enforce sentence. The general rule
is that the court upon revoking sentence may
execute a sentence already imposed or impose any
sentence which might have originally been given
to the defendant."' Such procedures follow
logically as a result of revocation. However, a
more serious issue arises when the trial court
attempts to alter the original sentence. This
problem, of course, does not arise where the court
has suspended the imposition of sentence. In that
case the court is not changing the original sen-
tence, since no sentence was in fact imposed
originally.
Suppose, however, the original sentence was
two years, but that execution was suspended.
May the court upon revoking probation decrease
the sentence to one year or increase it to three
years? The federal courts have dealt with both
situations. The rule is that the court may decrease
the sentence. 0 The Supreme Court, however,
struck down an attempted increase in sentence in
Roberts v. United States" on double jeopardy
3 Manning v. United States, 161 F.2d 827 (5th Cir.
1947). But see Bubler v. Pescor, 63 F. Supp. 632
(W.D. Mo. 1945), where a district judge refused to
follow the prevailing rule.
9 People v. Martin, 58 Cal. App. 2d 677, 137 P.2d
468 (1943).
100 See 18 U.S.C.A. 3651 (1948).
103 Scalia v. United States, 62 F.2d 220 (1st Cir. 1932).
Some states so provide by statute, see CoLo. Rnv,
STAT. Amx. §39-16-91 (1953).
"0 United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304 (1931).
10 320 U.S. 264 (1943).
grounds. Mr. Justice Frankfurter strongly dis-
sented, pointing out that the practical effect of
the Roberts decision was that a federal court can
increase the sentence after revocation if the judge
originally suspended imposition of sentence, but
not if he suspended execution of sentence. The
dissenting justices refused to hang a constitutional
decision on so thin a distinction. This minority
view seems to be the stronger one."4
(3) Defendant's Rights with Regard to Revocation
(a) Arrest, Warrant. When the court or its
probation officer concludes that there is some
cause to review defendant's probationary conduct,
certain questions may arise. The first is whether
a probationer may be arrested for cause without a
warrant by the probation officer. The federal
statute and some state statutes specifically allow
arrest for' cause without a warrant in this situ-
ation. 05 While this point is debatable, it seems
legitimate to allow arrest for cause without a
warrant in the case of a probationer in order to
carry out the purposes of probation effectively.
(b) Hearing. An important question is whether
the defendant has a right to a hearing on the issue
of revocation. If he does have such a right, what
are its nature and scope?"' Where defendant is
accorded a statutory hearing, the courts usually
construe the scope of that hearing in accord with
the statute. Nevertheless, all aspects of the hearing
procedure are not spelled out in the statute. The
result is that in those states not having statutory
hearing and to some extent in those that do,
constitutional due process issues are often litigated.
In Ascoe v. Zerbst'°' the United States Supreme
Court held that a hearing must be held before
revocation. The Court was quick to point out
that the federal hearing was a statutory and not a
constitutional right. This view also prevails
among the states. A number of states, however,
have held that there is a constitutional right to a
hearing on revocation."'8
The writer submits that the federal view of not
giving a full constitutional hearing in a probation
revocation is the correct one. This is a matter
best governed by statute, not by strict constitu-
tional standards, It may be that the minimum
114 For a criticism of the majority holding see 59
COLUm. L. REv. 311 (1959).
105 18 U.S.C.A. 3652 (1948).
06 About half of the states and the federal system
provide a hearing by statute. 59 YAr L.J. 1521, 1522Z1950).
1 295 U.S. 490 (1935).
20' 51 Ariz. 64, 74 P.2d 569 (1937).
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requirements of constitutional due process should
be applied in a case such as Ex parte Dearo,109
where California went so far as to permit ex parte
revocation while a man was in jail serving another
sentence. But a full constitutional hearing should
not be required."n
If defendant is to be afforded a statutory or
constitutional hearing with regard to probation
revocation, subsidiary questions arise as to the
proper procedure for such a hearing. It seems
essential that some form of notice be given the
defendant of the intention to revoke and for what
alleged violation of probation. Some statutes
require such notice, and those states holding that
defendant has a constitutional right to a hearing
naturally extend constitutional protection to
notice and other procedural safeguards."'
Right to counsel at a probation hearing is more
controversial than notice. Some courts deny any
right to counsel at all. A better view would be at
least to allow defendant to have counsel present
at his own expense. In contrast, some courts
require counsel as a constitutional matter."'
Where one comes out on the issue of right to
counsel at a probation hearing is necessarily tied
up with one's notion of the nature and purpose
of the hearing itself, discussed above.
Many other problems are becoming important
with regard to probation hearings. Questions arise
as to the rules of evidence to be employed in such
proceedings, and whether defendant should have
a chance to view the probation officer's report."'
The precise procedures to be employed in a pro-
bation hearing are just beginning to develop in
the law of probation and must await further
adjudication and statutory clarification.
Problems of Appeal
(1) Procedure. The introduction of probation
into American law has raised certain problems
regarding appellate procedure. One of these
-concerns statutes allowing appeal only from a
"final judgement." Is a grant of probation a
"final judgement" and therefore appealable?
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in
Birnbaum v. United States"14 refused to allow a
109 96 Cal. App. 2d 141, 214 P.2d 585 (1950).
110 See Ex parle Boyd, 73 Okla. Crim. 441, 22 P.2d
162, 172 (1942).
M See 59 CoLum. L. RFv. 327 (1959).
"1 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
11 107 F.2d 885 (4th Cir. 1939).
defendant to appeal where probation had been
granted following the suspension of the imposi-
tion of sentence. The Supreme Court,, in a better
reasoned opinion, later held, however, that both
an order suspending execution of sentence and an
order suspending imposition of sentence are
"final decisions" and thus appealable."' Some
state courts, nevertheless, have continued to
harbor these procedural traps for the defendant
and deny a right to appeal once probation has
been granted." 6
The next question is whether a trial court may
grant probation after appeal and affirmance of
the conviction itself. No logical reason appears to
deny the court guch power, as the appeal is con-
cerned with only substantive matters of the trial
and not with the sentencing process at all. The
United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia has so reasoned, allowing probation
after appeal."
7
The Texas courts, however, hold that where
defendant appeals from a conviction, the trial
court loses jurisdiction to grant probation."n
It is hoped that future draftsmen and courts will
follow the federal practice and allow probation
after appeal.
Turning to another point, we note that even
if probation is a final decision, the defendant may
be barred from appeal on the ground of waiver.
The theory of this rule as laid down by the Ari-
zona Supreme Court"" is that defendant should not
be allowed to have the benefits of probation and
later be allowed to challenge errors at the trial.
But query, why prevent a defendant from later
-attempting to cure trial defects, providing usual
time for appeal has not run? Perhaps this waiver
of appeal after probation rule needs further exami-
nation by the courts.
(2) Scope of Appellate Review. The scope of
appellate court review is very limited with regard
to the granting of probation. The great weight of
authority is in favor of allowing the trial court
great discretion in granting or denying probation."'1
With regard to revocation, however, appellate
"' Korematsu v. United States, 319 U.S. 432 (1943).
116 See State v. Farmer,. 39 Wash. 675, 237 P.2d
734 (1951).
"1 Gatson v. United States, 143 F.2d 10 (D.C. Cir.
1941).
1 State v. Klein, 154 Tex. Crim. 31, 224 S.W.2d 250
(1949), 28 Tax. L. Rtv. 986 (1950).
"9 Brooks v. State, 51 Ariz. 544, 78 P.2d 498 (1938).
12" People v. Racine, 201 Ark. 542, 1 N.E.2d 63
(1936).
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courts tend to scrutinize the trial courts' action
much more dosely. Outwardly the scope of review
is the same regarding revocation and the grant
itself, namely, whether the trial court has abused
its discretion.
In examining appellate cases, nevertheless,
one finds surprisingly detailed rehashing of the
trial courts' reasons for revoking probation.In
Perhaps some appellate courts engage in such a
broad scope of review due to their states' giving a
revocation hearing as a matter of constitutional
right. That is not the case, however, in many
states and in the federal system. It is submitted
that either appellate courts ought to respect the
trial judge's discretion regarding revocation, as
they respect it in connection with the grant itself,
or they ought to change the test of the scope of
review.
To the extent that the probation system is
grounded on a notion that the trial judge is trained
in the difficult art of sentencing, appellate courts
should have only a narrow scope of review.
They are once removed from the probation hear-
ing. The whole area of appellate review of proba-
tion is one for future study and analysis.
SUMtURY
The law of probation has developed considerably
in the last three decades, and in the process a
number of problems have also developed. A
reappraisal is needed. Suggestions are offered
herein with regard to specific solutions in the
problem areas.
In general, this paper has favored the federal
probation practice as that most in line with the
broad purposes of probation. Thus, the federal
rule with regard to time when probation may be
granted appears sound. As long as execution of
sentence has not begun, there is no apparent reason
to refuse a court power to grant probation. Simi-
larly, the federal practice of allowing a court to
enforce a sentence after a void suspension of
sentence of either type would seem the preferable
approach, as long as some statute of limitations
or laches is applied.
With regard to revocation of probation, the
federal approach granting the defendant a hearing
suggests itself as a model for the states. Certainly
some minimum due process should attach requiring
notice to the defendant and a right to be heard.
121 See State v. White, 232 N.C: 385, 61 S.E.2d 754
(1950); United States v. Van Riper, 92 F.2d 1020
(2d Cir. 1938).
Whether a full trial-type of constitutional hearing
should be required is another matter. This com-
mentator does not mean to suggest that de-
fendant's rights should be narrowed with regard
to the various legal problems of probation. What
is put forth is that, except for minimum safeguards,
defendant's rights can best be served by statutory
and not by constitutional restrictions. This con-
clusion is based on the notion that in order to have
an effective probation system, we must not tie
the hands of the sentencing judge. Instead, we
should give the court every possible modem
sentencing aid unhampered by unnecessary
legal technicalities.
In some other respects the federal practice
should be modified. The federal rule denying
defendant the right to refuse probation should be
overruled, not on the grounds of lack of power
in the courts to enforce a sentence, but as a policy
decision against forcing a defendant to be subject
to probation. In addition, the federal cases con-
cerning probation where more than one count is
involved and with regard to probation and a
fine are needlessly restrictive.
The thin distinction of Roberts v. United Statesm
regarding increase of sentence after revocation
should be disregarded, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter
argues in his strong dissent.
Certain undesirable state practices, differing
from the federal scheme, appear to turn upon
either faulty drafting of probation statutes or
upon judicial grafting of legal technicalities upon
those statutes. Thus, in connection* with appeal
state distinctions between suspension of imposition
and suspension of execution of sentence are highly
undesirable. Similarly, the rule that only the
sentencing judge may revoke probation should be
abandoned. The Ohio practice of placing no time
limit on revocation dearly should not be en-
couraged elsewhere.
Several problems common to both federal and
,state systems require attention. The first concerns
who may be granted probation. This is a problem
for the legislature in redefining the areas in which
probation is available according to some rational
scheme. Another problem is that of the confused
case law concerning restitution as a condition of
probation. This area especially calls for clarifica-
tion. One more problem is the need for a re-
examination of the scope of appellate review with
regard to probation revocation.
1 320 U.S. 264 (1943).
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The highlighting of these problems is meant not
as criticism of the historical trends in the law of
probation, but as illustration of the continuing
need for reclarification as the law of probation
develops. The reader may readily take issue with
the conclusions reached herein; nevertheless, it
is hoped that he will see the need for present day
modifications in the law of probation. In this re-
gard Dean Roscoe Pound recently wrote:
"Although it is dearly indicated how much
remains to be done to make probation achieve
all that it should, as I look back to 1890 when I
was admitted to the bar... I cannot but be
encouraged by reflecting how far we have
progressed in the face of great difficulties in
not more than a generation. '"m
The time is at hand to capitalize upon these as-
sets of the law of probation. Solution of the prob-
lems now coming to the fore can turn a rapidly
developing probation system into a mature body
of law.
12 POUND, CRIME, COURTS AND PROBATION (Intro-
duction) (1941).
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